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CHAPTER 17 
Agency 
AUSTIN T. STICKELLS 
§17.1. Borrowed servant: Contributed employee. In Weiss v. 
Republic Pipe 6- Supply Corp.1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding by the jury that the 
defendant undertook to contribute a driver and equipment for unload-
ing but that the jury was also warranted in finding that the driver 
did not become the servant of the plaintiff's employer. 
The plaintiff was injured by a boiler which fell upon him while 
it was being delivered to his employer. The defendant had requested 
that there be some men ready to accept delivery and the plaintiff 
was present with other employees for this purpose. There was a 
conflict as to whether the boiler was to be delivered to the sidewalk 
or to the cellar. The accident occurred on the cellar steps. At the 
time of the accident the plaintiff was exercising some supervision 
but was not otherwise assisting. The cause of the accident was the 
slipping or loosening of the knot tied by the defendant's employee 
to hold the boiler as it was removed from the truck to the basement. 
When the Court stated that the driver and equipment could be 
found to be contributed, did it mean that the driver became the 
servant of the plaintiff's employer? The fact that the plaintiff was 
exercising supervisory power did not of itself give rise to a borrowed 
servant relation. Other factors were necessary, the Court holding it 
to be a question of control with respect to details. A general super-
visory power, such as the giving of directions as to where the boiler 
was to be placed, was not such control. If the driver was not a 
borrowed servant then the word "contributed" means that the de-
fendant agreed to make delivery to the basement, thus making both 
the plaintiff's employer and the defendant parties to the venture. A 
combination of employees under different employers does not make 
the employees fellow servants. 
§17.2. Negligence of independent contractor. Todd v. Wernick1 
presented the question of insulation from liability by the use of an in-
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dependent contractor. In this case a child of seven years was killed 
by the fall of a boom used for pulling tar and gravel to the defendant's 
roof. The boom had been erected by employees of an independent 
contractor. The Court found for the defendant under the principle 
that when the owner of a building uses due care in the selection of 
an independent contractor, he will not be responsible for the neg-
ligence of the contractor or the contractor's servants in the performance 
of the work unless a nuisance will be created or harm would occur 
unless guarded against. 
§17.3. Creation of agency: Tenancy relationships. Two cases 
decided during the SURVEY year considered the problem of who may be 
deemed an agent. The first case,1 involving tenants by the entirety, 
held that the husband was an agent for his wife; the second case 2 
held that a co-tenant in common was not by virtue of the tenancy 
an agent of the other co-tenant. In the Le Blanc case, in which the 
husband and wife had contracted to sell an estate held by the entirety, 
their relationship, the fact that each had signed the contract, and 
their conduct on being notified of the place of performance were 
sufficient to permit a finding of an agency relation. The case does 
not change the basic principle that the relationship of tenants by the 
entirety does not of itself create an agency but it does indicate that 
additional facts, essentially minor, will do so. In the Goodhue case 
it was held that the tenancy in common was distinct from an agency 
relationship and that the knowledge of a co-tenant that his mother 
had authorized removal of small quantities of gravel to pay taxes 
did not warrant a finding that he had authorized her to be his agent 
to contract for the removal of all the gravel and loam contained in 
thirty acres. 
§17.4. Real estate broker: Right to commission. When a broker 
procures a customer ready, able and willing to buy on the terms 
of the principal, he is not required to show a completion of the sale 
in order to obtain his commission. The fact that a letter signed by 
the buyer provided for purchase "if suitable terms and conditions can 
be agreed upon" did not change the result when the court found as 
a matter of fact that the customer was ready, willing and able to buy 
on the vendor's terms.1 
§17.5. Real estate broker: Extent of authority. A broker had 
been expressly informed by the purchasers in Vallis v. Rimer 1 that 
they could not purchase the house except with the aid of a GI mort-
gage. The agreement of purchase, however, contained no provision 
for the return of the deposit in the event the sale was not approved 
by the Veterans Administration. There was no evidence to indicate 
§17.3. 1 Le Blanc v. Molloy, 335 Mass. 636, 141 N.E.2d 519 (1957). 
2 Goodhue v. Leonardi, 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 143 N.E.2d 200. 
§17.4. 1 McKallagat v. La Cognata, 335 Mass. 376, 140 N.E.2d 185 (1957). 
§17.5. 1335 Mass. 528, 140 N.E.2d 638 (1957). 
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that the seller knew of the necessity of the GI mortgage or that the 
sale would take place only upon approval of the Veterans Admin-
istration. The Court held that a broker was at most a special agent 
and a person dealing with him has implied notice of his limited 
authority. As no express authority had been given to the broker to 
limit the transaction by making it subject to the approval of the 
Veterans Administration, the purchaser could not recover his deposit. 
Nothing was said by the Court of the possibility of imputing the 
knowledge of the agent to the principal.2 
2 The inexperience of the broker and her consequent failure to realize the limits 
of her authority were largely responsible for misleading the purchasers in the Vallis 
case. Acts of 1957. c. 726, providing for the licensing of real estate brokers after 
examination, will help protect purchasers in this type of situation. For a discus-
&ion of this statute, see §11.6 supra. 
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